When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design of the object being procured affects the resulting degree of competition. This paper highlights the interaction between the optimal procurement mechanism and the design choice. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the sponsor's design choice, instead of homogenizing the market to generate competition, promotes heterogeneity.
Introduction
Most procurement processes take place within a competitive environment characterized by horizontally differentiated potential contractors. In such cases, depending on the design of the object being procured, the sponsor may emphasize characteristics which one of the competitors has comparative advantage over, thus discriminating in favor of her. Within this framework, we address the following question: Which is the optimal design for the procured project, given that its choice affects the market structure, and consequently the induced degree of competition?
Consider, for example, a government interested in designating a telecommunications company as a 1 universal service provider. Firms interested in providing such services range from wired telecommunications companies and TV cable operators, to wireless telephone companies. Depending on the minimum quality standards set by the government for the services included in the universal service requirements (i.e., completion rate of calls, portability ease, etc.), different type of competitors may enjoy a comparative cost advantage. Hence, the government's choice of the minimum service requirements will affect the outcome of the competitive bidding process that might be used. When analyzing the issue of project design, the literature has focused on the case of vertically differentiated designs (e.g. Che, 1993) . There, projects of higher quality are universally more costly to produce. Moreover, the contractors' ranking in terms of efficiency is preserved across designs, i.e., the efficiency parameters of contractors are perfectly correlated across designs. The result is that the 2 optimal mechanism discounts quality in order to ''homogenize'' the market.
In contrast here, not only do we assume that designs are horizontally differentiated, and hence as we move along the design spectrum some firms become more efficient and others less efficient (in a stochastic sense), but moreover, we assume that a contractor's actual efficiency parameters in various designs are independent draws from a family of distributions related under first-order stochastic 3 dominance. This implies that if contractors are asked to bid for a variety of possible designs , each contractor would have to prepare a multitude of proposals (or in a direct revelation mechanism to report the values of many parameters). Nonetheless, submitting proposals is costly. Hence, it is unnatural to assume that contractors bid over many different designs. This creates the need for design management. The sponsor should first choose a design, and then engage in a competitive bidding process.
The paper highlights the interaction between the optimal mechanism and the design choice when these two decisions are taken sequentially. The optimal mechanism in an environment characterized by heterogeneous competitors, as it is already known in the literature (e.g. Myerson, 1981; McAfee and McMillan, 1989) , resembles a discriminatory auction. Nonetheless, the intensity of discrimination is a function of the degree of the comparative advantage one of the potential contractors has over her competitors. This comparative advantage is endogenized here, and it is determined by the project's design choice.
We find that the sponsor's design choice, instead of homogenizing the market to generate competition, promotes heterogeneity (i.e. it increases the comparative advantage one of the potential contractors has). This is the case because of the way the optimal mechanism interacts with the degree of heterogeneity induced by the design choice. The more tilted in favor of a competitor is the design, the more discriminatory against this competitor the optimal mechanism will be. Intuitively, had not the sponsor been able to discriminate, she would have liked to choose a design that homogenizes the market to generate fiercer competition. Her ability to discriminate via the mechanism levels the field for the contractors even if one of them has a comparative advantage. This reduces the cost of having a less ''competitive market'', and therefore, the sponsor chooses a design that increases the chances that the ''naturally'' advantaged firm will get a favorable cost realization.
The following section sets up the model. Section 3 solves and discusses the two-type case. Section 4 extends these results to a continuum of types. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
The model

Preferences and technology
A risk neutral sponsor, S, wants to undertake a single indivisible project. The project may be implemented according to many different specifications, called designs ( There are two risk neutral profit maximizing firms, denoted by i [ hA, Bj. They are located at the end-points of the design spectrum, i.e., at 0 and 1 respectively. Each firm has comparative advantage over designs closer to its location. The comparative advantage is expressed in terms of lower expected costs to undertake the project. Formally, given a design d, the degree of induced comparative advantage is defined as x(d), where
1 2 2d otherwise. This assumption states that depending on the degree of the induced comparative advantage the cost distributions are ordered in a first order stochastic dominance sense.
This is a hazard rate dominance assumption, and implies that informational rents are larger for the 4 firm that has the comparative advantage.
] Assumption 3. ≠f(x,c) / ≠x 5 2 ≠f(2x,c) / ≠x, ;c [ [c, c] . ] This is a ''neutrality'' of the design with respect to the industry cost assumption. A beneficial for one firm change in the design hurts equally the other firm. And, finally, the standard monotone hazard rate assumption.
Description of procurement mechanism o
Procurement proceeds in two steps. First, the sponsor announces the project's design d . Then, each firm learns its cost of undertaking the project under the announced design and participates in the mechanism. The sequential character of procurement, as explained in the Introduction, is due to the 5 fact that it is costly to the firms to discover their cost for a particular design. Working backwards, the sponsor's problem is addressed in two steps.
Characterization of the optimal mechanism given an arbitrary design
The problem we address is a special case of Myerson (1981) . Due to the revelation principle, we can concentrate on direct revelation mechanisms. The mechanism comprises two vectors c(d) 5 h p(c , the payment made to that firm. The sponsor's objective is to find the mechanism that maximizes her expected net surplus subject to the relevant incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and * * feasibility constraints. The solution to this problem is the optimal mechanism, c (d) 5 h p (c , c ),
Characterization of the optimal design, d
2
*
Given the optimal mechanism, the sponsor solves the following problem: 
Symmetric information benchmark
Given an arbitrary design, d, the sponsor asks the firms to compute their costs, and awards the 7 project to the firm with the lowest cost. Hence, when deciding on the design, she can compute each design's expected cost, which is:
The design that maximizes her net surplus, 
The next proposition summarizes the main feature of the optimal design. 
Note that the sponsor does not procure the gross surplus maximizing design. The intuition is the * following: Moving away from d and towards the closest end-point reduces the expected cost of the advantaged firm, at the cost of an equal increase in the expected cost of the disadvantaged firm. Nonetheless, since the probability that the project is awarded to the advantaged firm is larger, the first effect dominates. The optimal design is then derived by trading off the cost enhancement effect vs. the * loss in gross surplus due to the procurement of a design other than d .
Asymmetric information case
Given an arbitrary design, the sponsor's problem is to design a mechanism to maximize her surplus net of the expected ''virtual cost'' (i.e., the sum of the expected production cost and of the expected The project's expected cost depends only on the expected cost of the advantaged firm. Hence, the sponsor has stronger incentives to choose a design that increases the probability that the advantaged firm gets a favorable cost realization. The optimal design is given by the first order condition:
Proposition 2. The optimal design, d , is more extreme than the one being procured under symmetric
The sponsor's optimal design makes the firms more heterogeneous than under symmetric information. The intuition is the following: The optimal mechanism allows the sponsor to eliminate the informational rents of the advantaged firm. On the other hand, the informational rents given to the ] disadvantaged firm are large (it always gets c). Therefore, the sponsor is even more willing to distort the design in a way that increases the chances that the advantaged firm is awarded the project, i.e., it gets a favorable cost realization. The optimal design choice expresses the trade off between rent extraction (the reason for which the sponsor procures a more extreme design) and allocative 10 * inefficiency (the cost of moving away from d ).
The continuum-of-types case
Asymmetric information case when discrimination is allowed
The continuum-of-types case is an application of Myerson (1981) 
Given the optimal mechanism, the sponsor's expected cost of implementing the project is:
Lemma 3. C(x) is decreasing in the degree of the induced comparative advantage, x(d).
The intuition behind this result is the same as that in the two-type case. Since the optimal mechanism reduces the informational rents given to the more efficient firm, the sponsor's expected 10 One should not interpret this result as showing that when discriminatory mechanisms are employed competition is not important. It is straightforward to show that net surplus increases as more firms locate at each end-point (a proxy for more * competition). Not only expected cost decreases, but also the procured design converges fast towards d . cost decreases in the probability that the more efficient firm is awarded the project. As a result, the optimal design is similar to the one in the two-type case. 
Asymmetric information case when discrimination is not allowed
The sponsor is now not allowed to discriminate against any of the two firms, i.e., attention is restricted to anonymous mechanisms. Although we do not make any claim about its optimality among this restricted class of mechanisms, we consider a second-price auction; the project is awarded to the firm with the lowest cost announcement, and the winner receives a transfer equal to the cost announcement of the losing firm. The sponsor's expected cost of implementing the project is:
Lemma 4. C (x) is increasing in the degree of the induced comparative advantage, x(d).
The result is now the opposite. By making the two firms more homogeneous, the sponsor intensifies competition, and this results to a lower transfer. Not surprisingly, the result on the optimal design is now reversed. 
SPA
This result highlights the fact that the discriminatory nature of the optimal mechanism is crucial for the characterization of the optimal market structure. Only if discrimination is allowed the sponsor would actually want to make, by the appropriate design choice, the contractors more heterogeneous.
Conclusions
When procurement takes place within an environment characterized by horizontally differentiated potential contractors, the design of the project being procured becomes a strategic variable the sponsor can use to influence the degree of competition among the contractors. We find that when the sponsor is able to use discriminatory mechanisms the optimal design promotes heterogeneity among contractors.
